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Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the
Family, and the Dream That Is America
By ROBERT S. CHANG*
We should transform 'reverse racism' from a curse to an injunc-
tion (Reverse racism!).
-David Roediger'
I am a product of affirmative action. Thus, to imagine a world
without affirmative action would require that I imagine a world with-
out me, something that I am not inclined to do. I am reminded of a
cartoon which depicts the philosopher Descartes saying, "I think,
therefore I am." The second frame shows him musing, "I think not,
therefore.... ." The last frame is blank. I find it ironic that so many
affirmative action babies can advocate against the policy responsible
for their very existence. And although I disagree with much of what
Stephen Carter says, I agree with him that we must invert the negative
meaning attributed to the term "affirmative action baby," and in order
to do so, we must embrace the term rather than reject it.2 And so, let
me repeat, without shame, I am a product of affirmative action. And I
refuse to imagine my own non-existence.
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. A.B. 1988, Princeton Uni-
versity; M.A., J.D. 1992, Duke University. Copyright 1996 Robert S. Chang.
This is a footnoted and slightly expanded version of a talk that I delivered at the 1996
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Symposium: The Meanings of Merit. I would like
to thank Professor Keith Wingate of Hastings and Veronica Parkansky of the Quarterly for
inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank Keith Aoki, Maggie Chon, Adrienne
Davis, Neil Gotanda, Peter Halwood, Todd Hughes, Lisa Ikemoto, Cynthia Lee, Laura
Padilla, and Donna Young for the conversations we had while I was writing this Essay.
Thanks also to Jackie Chin, Jerry Kang, Nancy Levit, and Leti Volpp for comments on a
later draft. Special thanks to Selena Dong for listening to ideas develop to fruition. Very
able research assistance was provided by Melinda Aiello and David Suzuki. Work on this
Essay was supported by a Publication Award from California Western School of Law.
1. DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE,
POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISrORY 17 (1994).
2. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 4-5
(1991).
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When confronting those who would abolish affirmative action on
the basis of race and/or gender in education, employment, and con-
tracting, my initial facetious response is to say, "Sure. But only if you
get rid of the affirmative action policies that are putting Black and,
increasingly, Hispanic men in prison for long periods of time." One
particularly egregious statistic was produced by the Georgia criminal
justice system where 99% of those in prison for life under its second
drug offender statute are African Americans.3 Results such as this do
not occur without affirmative action, which takes place in the form of
selective enforcement, selective prosecution, and selective sentenc-
ing.4 So if we are going to get rid of affirmative action, I say that we
should start with the criminal justice system.
Facetiousness is perhaps not the best approach to winning de-
bates, but I use this notion of affirmative action in our prisons to do
two things: first, to contest our stock understandings of affirmative
action;5 and second, to see how committed the anti-affirmative action
forces are to a broad vision of social justice.
People often mean very different things when they talk about af-
firmative action. To help clarify the discussion, David Oppenheimer
offers five possible, non-exclusive meanings that might come under
the rubric of affirmative action: (1) quotas, (2) preferences, (3) self-
studies, (4) outreach and counseling, and (5) anti-discrimination.6
Although these meanings are useful in clarifying the debate, they do
not remedy the lack of engagement that often mars conversations on
affirmative action. This lack of engagement comes more from the dif-
ferent sides having vastly different notions of fairness or merit that
inform their construction of "affirmative action." These different no-
3. Although African Americans make up approximately 27% of the Georgia popula-
tion, "240 of 243 persons convicted under OCGA § 16-13-30(d) from its enactment in 1982
until May 1993 were African American. The bulk of these convictions involved guilty
pleas for sales of less than $100 worth of cocaine." Natsu Saito Jenga, Unconscious: The
"Just Say No" Response to Racism, 81 IowA L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (citing GEORGIA
Sup. Cr. COMM'N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURT SYSTEM, LET JUSTICE BE
DONE: EQUALLY, FAIRLY, AND IMPARTIALLY 161 (1995)).
4. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE
L.J. 214 (1983); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283 (1995); and Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on
the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23
(1994).
5. Professor Yxta Maya Murray similarly uses narrative to contest our stock under-
standings of "merit" in order to develop a more inclusive meaning of "merit." See Yxta
Maya Murray, Merit Teaching, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1996).
6. See generally Section I of David B. Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Ac-
tion, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1996).
tions of fairness or merit stem, in part, from the use of different tem-
poral frameworks in evaluating the need for affirmative action.7
The forces that would save affirmative action characterize it as
necessary to equalize opportunities for racial minorities. 8 This view is
informed by a notion of fairness located within an expansive temporal
framework that allows consideration of the history of racial and
gender oppression in addition to ongoing racial and gender
discrimination.
The forces that would destroy affirmative action offer a compet-
ing notion of fairness located within a narrow temporal framework
that allows consideration only of the immediate parties to the transac-
tion in questionY The anti-affirmative action forces often characterize
affirmative action as reverse discrimination or reverse racism, and tell
the story of the innocent white male. This story has captured the pub-
lic's attention in such a way that affirmative action is suffering what
might be termed "death by anecdote."
The most gruesome death by anecdote that I have had the misfor-
tune to witness took place during the 1990 United States Senate race
in North Carolina between Jesse Helms, the white incumbent, and
7. My discussion of "expansive" and "narrow" temporal frameworks finds an ana-
logue in Charles Lawrence's discussion of "humanistic historical reasoning" versus "cate-
gorical historical analysis":
Hoffer, an historian, argues that courts should use "humanistic historical reason-
ing" rather than the categorical historical analysis employed by the Court in
Croson. Categorical historical analysis seeks to narrow the historical record and
context of a case, while humanistic historical reasoning situates cases within a
more expansive and wider historical social context.
Charles R. Lawrence, HI, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and
Talk about Race, Again, 15 B.C. THrmD WoRLD LJ. 1, 7 n.24 (1995) (citing Peter Charles
Hoffer, "Blind to History": The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 270, 278-79 (1992)).
8. See, eg., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirma-
tive Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. Rnv. 1327 (1986). Many proponents of affirmative action
do not address the gender component of affirmative action. I discuss one possible explana-
tion for this omission infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty
Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEx. L. Rv. 993, 1008 (1993). Paulsen creatively
argues in the form of a judicial opinion that:
The third answer to the embarrassment of present statistical [racial] dispar-
ity.., is not (or at least has not been shown in this court to be) present, or even
recent, racial discrimination in law faculty hiring. Rather, as plaintiff argues, the
likely cause is general, diffuse social discrimination in the increasingly distant past
that has made law practice (and thus law teaching) a white male bastion. That
fact, of course, does not justify visiting the sins of the fathers on the sons; present-
day racial discrimination against particular individuals is no remedy for past social
discrimination.
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Harvey Gantt, the African American challenger. One commercial for
the Helms campaign featured "a white working class man tearing up a
rejection letter while the voice-over said, 'You needed that job, and
you were the best qualified... But it had to go to a minority because
of a racial quota." ' 10 I recall seeing a political cartoon after the elec-
tion that showed a brown hand crumpling up an application for the
United States Senate with a caption that said, "You were better quali-
fied, but ... ." However, this cartoon came too late-Gantt had al-
ready lost.
We see here that narrative is not solely the province of those who
engage in outsider jurisprudence to further a progressive social
agenda." For those who would save affirmative action, we must come
up with some pretty good stories of our own if we wish to avoid this
death by anecdote. But as we frame our stories, we must pay atten-
tion to the temporal dimension because the choice of temporal frame-
work is often determinative in deciding what is "fair."
The recent appellate opinion in Hopwood v. Texas'2 illustrates
this point. The appellate court chose a narrow temporal framework in
which the actors were limited to the University of Texas School of
Law, Cheryl Hopwood and the other white plaintiffs who were re-
jected, and the African American and Hispanic admittees. Given this
framework, the story told is one of a law school that has not had de
jure segregation since 1950.' Further, according to the appellate
10. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1767 n.261 (1993)
(citing ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNE.
QUAL 202 (1992)).
11. For the use of narrative in the pursuit of a progressive social agenda, see generally
Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). There is voluminous litera-
ture debating the merits of such methodology. For some recent exchanges, see Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); Colloquy:
Choosing Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1844 (1990) (contribu-
tions by Scott Brewer, Milner Ball, Robin Barnes, Richard Delgado, and Leslie Espinoza,
all responding to Kennedy); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse,
81 GEO. LJ. 251 (1992); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO.
L.J. 313 (1992) (responding to Tushnet); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Sto-
ries Out of Schook An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994) (responding to Farber &
Sherry).
For one recent article using narrative to criticize race consciousness in the Asian
American context, see Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IowA L. REv. 145 (1994). For responses,
see Colloquy: The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IowA L.
REv. (forthcoming 1996) (contributions by Keith Aoki, Maggie Chon, Garrett Epps, Neil
Gotanda, Dennis Green, Natsu Saito Jenga, Peter Kwan, Gerald Torres, and Alfred Yen).
12. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
court, "[a]ny other discrimination by the law school ended in the
1960s.' 4 After the appellate court relegated the law school's overtly
discriminatory practices safely to the past, the court could more easily
conclude that the law school did not discriminate against present-day
African American and Hispanic applicants, and that there was, there-
fore, nothing to be remedied. 5
The use of a narrow temporal framework that limits the relevant
institutional actors leads to the following result: there will never be
any present-day effects of a law school's past discrimination on pres-
ent-day minority applicants, especially as we move further, tempo-
rally, from de jure segregation. In a narrow temporal framework, the
most visible "discrimination" is perpetrated by the school or employer
or governmental entity against white applicants. Although this "dis-
crimination" may seem unfair, it is only unfair in the context of this
circumscribed narrative. Change the assumptions and background
conditions, and what is unfair changes.' 6 The struggle over the appro-
priate temporal framework becomes important as each side tries to
control the stories that will inform the public's stock understandings
of affirmative action.
In addition to using the notion of affirmative action in the crimi-
nal justice system to question our understanding of "affirmative ac-
tion," I also use it to see whether the anti-affirmative action forces are
committed to a broad vision of social justice. Are the anti-affirmative
action forces motivated by a narrow vision that allows them to see
injustice only when it affects the so-called innocent white male, or are
they interested in seeking racial justice more broadly? Phrased differ-
ently, are they committed to reversing racism in the United States? I
see this as an open question, although I have doubts about their
commitment.
My doubts come from my sense that the attack on affirmative
action is not an isolated phenomenon. I see this attack as part of a
larger, broad-based movement organized against immigration and
multiculturalism. If we are to understand the current struggle over
14. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953. 1 find this assertion puzzling in light of the district
court's opinion, which detailed the continuing failure of publicly-funded higher education
in Texas, including its graduate and professional programs, to eliminate the vestiges of its
past de jure segregation. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555-56 (W.D. Tex. 1994). In
fact, it was not until 1983 that the Office of Civil Rights accepted a plan that was in con-
formity with Title VI. Id. at 556.
15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953-54.
16. See STANLEY FISH, THERE's No SucH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 4 (1994).
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affirmative action, we must place it within the larger social context of
what might be called a national identity crisis.' 7
America is under assault. Or so the anti-immigrant, anti-affirma-
tive action, anti-multiculturalism forces would have you believe.'
8
This assault is both literal and figurative. It is literal in the sense that
the invasion by and proliferation of Black, Brown, and Yellow bodies
poses a literal threat to the continued vitality and viability of America.
This sense of threat is captured vividly in a statement made by the
head of Stop Immigration Now: "'I have no intention of being the
object of "conquest," peaceful or otherwise, by Latinos, Asians,
blacks, Arabs or any other group of individuals who have claimed my
country." ' 19
Changes in demographics have created the specter of a coming
majority of color that threatens to eclipse the numerical white major-
ity. This perceived threat is so great that many white Americans exag-
gerate the number of racial minorities present in this country. Here
are some figures from a recent poll reported in The New York Times:
Percentage of the United States population that
white Americans think is Hispanic: 14.7.
Percentage that is Hispanic: 9.5.
Percentage that white Americans think is black: 23.8.
Percentage that is black: 11.8.
Percentage that white Americans think is Asian: 10.8.
Percentage that is Asian: 3.1.
Percentage that white Americans think is white: 49.9.
Percentage that is white: 74.20
We see from these statistics that many white Americans already be-
lieve that minorities have taken over. Given this colorful vision of
white Americans, I do not think we are ready for color-blindness, as
Neil Gotanda discusses in this Symposium.
2 '
17. I discuss this national identity crisis in greater detail in Robert S. Chang, A Medita-
tion on Borders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN TiE UNI ED STATES (Juan Perea ed., forthcoming 1996).
18. See generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT
AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); JARED TAYLOR, PAVED WITH GOOD INTEN-
TIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992).
19. Timothy Christenfeld, The World: Alien Expressions; Wretched Refuse Is Just the
Start, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1996, § 4, at 4 (quoting Ruth Coffey).
20. Priscilla Labovitz, Immigration-Just the Facts, N.Y. TiMEs, March 25, 1996, at
A19.
21. Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Colorblind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California
Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1996). For a discussion of color-blind
constitutionalism generally, compare Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) and Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Seances and
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In addition to the literal, the assault is figurative in the sense that
the very meaning of America is said to be at stake. Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., observes astutely that
[a] struggle to redefine the national identity is taking place... in
many arenas-in our politics, our voluntary organizations, our
churches, our language-and in no arena more crucial than our
system of education .... The debate about the curriculum is a
debate about what it means to be an American. What is ulti-
mately at stake is the shape of the American future. 2
Schlesinger then argues that "[t]he American synthesis has an inevita-
ble Anglo-Saxon coloration" that must be preserved through proper
education if we are to avoid "disintegration of the national commu-
nity, apartheid, Balkanization, [and] tribalization. '2 3 We see here that
the stakes are high.
The assault, literal and figurative, threatens America both as na-
tion-state and nation-form. Hence the cry is to take America back,
and as my friend Sharon Horn says, to take back the world, to make
everything, everywhere, America.24
This desire to take back America might be called the "nativist's
dream of return." In the same way that immigrants sometimes dream
of a return to their homeland, the nativist also dreams of a return. I
describe this dream elsewhere as follows:
[M]y "accent-less" English [often] brings the question: "Where
did you learn to speak so well?" This question is often followed
by "Where are you from?" which E. San Juan, Jr., identifies as
not so far from the unasked but often present "When are you
going back?" This progression signals the questioner's dream of
my return.
The questioner's dream of return extends beyond wishing the
return or exclusion of people who look like me. Having no ex-
ternal homeland, the nativist is left to construct a homeland out
of an imagined past. Unlike immigrants who are separated
physically from their [imaginary] homeland, the nativist is sepa-
rated temporally (and perhaps only temporarily) from his. But
a return to the past is possible only in the future. The nostalgic
Color-Blind Ghosts, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 401 (1994) with ANDREw KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992).
22. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 2-3 (1991).
23. Id. at 67.
24. See Sharon K. Horn, Remarks at the Asian American Bar Association of New
York Annual Meeting and Awards Dinner (January 25, 1996).
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recollection of an America past (or Paradise lost) is projected
forward as an "America" that again might be.
25
It is political action that will take us there, through careful policing of
national and institutional borders. These policing efforts take the fol-
lowing forms: eliminating affirmative action, closing our borders,
making English our official language, and controlling the curriculum.
The attack on affirmative action, understood in this broader context,
leads me to doubt that those who cry reverse discrimination or reverse
racism are committed to reversing racism in the United States.
I want to add, though, that there is a suppressed gender dimen-
sion to all of this. The return to an America past is not just a return
to a former racial order; it is a return to a former gender order. The
struggle over affirmative action also operates to reinscribe patriarchy
through a return to the traditional family. Understood in this way, the
debate over merit and fairness mask the real issues-white entitle-
ment and patriarchy. We are witnessing a reconfiguration of white-
ness, and white racial solidarity is being invoked through an appeal to
"family" in order to interrupt potential class and gender solidarity.26
One possible outcome of this struggle over affirmative action is a
return to the former racial and gender order. I find it ironic but not
coincidental that this attempt to return to an old domestic order coin-
cides with the advent of the New World Order. Chantal Mouffe
makes precisely this point in the context of Western Europe:
Now that the enemy [Communism] has been defeated, the
meaning of democracy itself has become blurred and needs to
be redefined by the creation of a new frontier. This is much
more difficult for the moderate right and for the left than for the
radical right. For the latter has already found its enemy. It is
provided by the "enemy within," the immigrants, which are
presented by the different movements of the extreme right as a
25. Robert S. Chang, The Nativist's Dream of Return, 9 LA RAZA L.J. (forthcoming
1996) (1995 Latinalo Law Professor Colloquium) (citation omitted) (manuscript at 5, on
file with the author).
26. Recently, there has been a growing interest in whiteness as a racial phenomenon. I
have been influenced by the following works: THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF
THE WHITE RACE: RACIAL OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1994); IAN F. HANEY Lo-
PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); ERIC LOTT, LOVE &
THEFT: BLACKFACE MINSTRELSY AND THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1995); DAVID
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991); DAVID ROEDIGER, TOwARDs THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS:
ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY (1994); ALEXANDER SAXTON,
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE REPUBLIC: CLASS POLITICS AND MASS CULTURE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See":
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953 (1993); Harris, supra note 10.
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threat to the cultural identity and national sovereignty of the
"true" Europeans.
27
In the context of the United States, racial minorities and feminists are
colored as the "enemy within" who threaten the cultural identity and
national sovereignty of the "true" Americans. And insofar as Derrick
Bell's "interest-convergence" theory is correct, with certain civil rights
gains furthering the Cold War imperatives of the United States,2" the
end of the Cold War and interest divergence may help to explain some
of the civil rights setbacks that we are enduring.
I will develop the thesis that merit and fairness are deployed in
ways that mask the real issues, white entitlement and patriarchy,2 9 by
describing three encounters I have had involving affirmative action.
These stories are about legacies, Asian Americans, and family. Two
took place while I was in college; the third took place last Fall.
I first encountered affirmative action in college when I met my
freshman year roommate. After saying hello, his first words were,
"Don't look in my closet. You'll see all sorts of preppie clothes in
there. You're probably not into that type of thing." He was right, but
I wondered what tipped him off-my Asian features, or my black con-
cert t-shirt from Bruce Springsteen's Born in the U.S.A. tour. His at-
tire, on the other hand, befitted a third or fourth generation Exeter/
Princeton student, and included his Granddad's or Great-Granddad's
Princeton Class of Nineteen-twenty-something cap. This was my first
encounter with an affirmative action baby, the kind that is termed, in
admissions parlance, a "legacy admit." He, of course, would never
admit to being an affirmative action baby, despite what I thought was
rather obvious evidence.
Because of this first encounter, I have always thought of affirma-
tive action as including legacies, athletes, musicians, the geographi-
cally diverse, and countless other "plus" categories that admissions
committees regularly utilize. A recent investigation by The Los Ange-
les Times revealed that the U.C. system seems to have another "plus"
27. CHANTAL MouHF, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL 3-4 (1993).
28. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 524 (1980). See also Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988); John Hayakawa
Torok, "Interest Convergence" and the Liberalization of Discriminatory Immigration and
Naturalization Laws Affecting Asians, 1943-1965, in CHINESE AMERICA: HISTORY AND
PERSPECTV ES (Chinese Historical Society of America ed., 1995).
29. Cheryl I. Harris makes this point about the connection of affirmative action doc-
trine and white entitlement brilliantly in her article, supra note 10, at 1766-77.
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category, what I call the U.C. Regents' Friends and Family Plan. (My
apologies to MCI.) The investigation revealed that a number of the
U.C. Regents who voted to do away with any preferential treatment
on the basis of race and/or gender "have privately used their influence
to try to get their relatives, friends, and children of business partners
into UCLA, in some cases ahead of better qualified applicants who
were turned away."'30 Although not all the attempts were successful, it
appears as though a number of the Regents' efforts resulted in dra-
matic turn-arounds, where applicants headed for rejection were ad-
mitted.3 ' If this is not affirmative action, then I do not know what is.
Yet I am often surprised when people find my conception of af-
firmative action to be impermissibly expansive, that awarding "pluses"
to legacies, athletes, musicians, and the geographically diverse is dif-
ferent from awarding "pluses" on the basis of race and/or gender.
Does it make a difference that, because of the history of racial oppres-
sion, legacies are disproportionately white?32 (Even geographic
diversity tends to benefit whites disproportionately.3 3) The counter-
argument is, of course, that whites are disproportionately benefitted
despite the fact that they are white and not because they are white.
However, this distinction between despite and because falls apart once
the temporal framework is expanded. Whites have a disproportionate
advantage because past race-based exclusionary policies ensured that
elite institutions were populated by whites, whose descendants are
now benefitting through legacy preferences.34 This is based on the
assumption that white alumni have white children, a not unreasonable
assumption when you consider that, even with the increased rate of
white interracial marriage, in 1987, twenty years after Loving v. Vir-
ginia,35 99% of white Americans were married to other whites.36
30. Ralph Frammolino et al., Some Regents Seek UCLA Admissions Priority for
Friends, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1996, at Al.
31. Id. at A18.
32. See JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYTH OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESs: THE CONSERVA-
TIVE ATTACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 151 (1995) ("The legacy system is particularly dam-
aging to minorities, who were largely excluded from the Ivy League colleges until the late
1960s."). In their investigation of Harvard, the Office for Civil Rights found specifically
that the use of preferences for legacies and athletes disproportionately benefitted whites.
John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and
Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 491, 509 (1993) (citing STATEMENT OF FINDINGS OF
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPLIANCE REVIEW 01-88-6009, 43).
33. Richard Kahlenberg, Class, not Race, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21, 27.
34. WILSON, supra note 32.
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring anti-miscegenation laws to be unconstitutional).
36. Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of Races in the United States, in RACE
103, 114 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
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When evaluating the role of legacies in the context of the affirma-
tive action debate, one should, as Stanley Fish admonishes us to do,
consider the source.37 The preference given to legacies has been de-
scribed as "the oldest form of affirmative action, dating from the ef-
forts to exclude Jews from elite colleges in the 1920s."'38 In a recent
article, John Lamb documents the history at Harvard and Yale of lega-
cies, whom he terms the "real affirmative action babies. '39 In the
1920s, in the face of increasing Jewish enrollment at their schools, "Ivy
League colleges began to consider the merits of quotas for Jewish stu-
dents and the advantages of preferences for alumni children."40
Harvard first attempted to use ceilings, but this provoked serious criti-
cism; instead, the university created a preference for sons of alumni in
order to squeeze out Jewish applicants.4 Other selective schools
adopted similar policies because none wanted to become a "dumping
ground for Jews."'42 All this "[t]o avoid being labeled 'Jewish
institutions.' 43
We can hear the echo of this fear of "Jewish institutions" in the
jokes that you may have heard about MIT standing for "Made in Tai-
wan," or UCLA as the "University of Caucasians Lost Among
Asians," or U.C. Irvine as the "University of Chinese Immigrants."
These jokes contain within them anxiety over the character of these
institutions that has led to affirmative action of a different sort, what
Jerry Kang terms "negative action" directed against Asian Ameri-
cans.44 This negative action is motivated by the notion that there can
be "too many Asians," an issue addressed by Selena Dong in a recent
article.
45
This brings me to my second story.
37. Stanley Fish, Bad Company, 56 TRANSITION 60, 66-67 (1992) (arguing "against the
assumption, so strongly embedded in liberal thought, that ideas are to be evaluated on
their merit and not on the basis of the historical condition of their emergence").
38. WILSON, supra note 32, at 149.
39. Lamb, supra note 32, at 491.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id. at 494.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 493.
44. Jerry Kang, Negative Action against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of
Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1996) (support-
ing affirmative action but criticizing Dworkin's rationale as allowing negative action
against Asian Americans).
45. Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination
Against Asian-Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1995).
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My second encounter with affirmative action also took place
when I was in college, when some Asian American student groups
made charges against the Princeton administration that Asian Ameri-
can applicants had more difficulty being admitted than Caucasian ap-
plicants. Similar charges were made against other highly selective
colleges, including Harvard, Yale, Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, and
UCLA.46
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) conducted investigations at
various schools, including Harvard.47 Although Asian American ap-
plicants who were admitted to Harvard did, on average, have stronger
academic credentials (insofar as SATs and grades have meaning) than
their white counterparts, much of that difference was attributed to
preferences given to alumni children and athletes.4s Both of these
groups (athletes and legacies) were largely white at Harvard.4 9 The
OCR concluded that there was no proof of invidious or intentional
discrimination against Asian Americans.50 The result was that a pol-
icy first instituted to keep Jews out had become a time-honored tradi-
tion, creating an entitlement that could not be disturbed. The
entitlement, coincidentally, was disproportionately held by whites.
It is more difficult to rationalize bias against Asian Americans at
public schools where alumni preferences do not play the role that they
do in the Ivies.51 Further, there is evidence of a "smoking gun," a
confidential UCLA memo that stated: "'The campus will endeavor to
curb the decline of Caucasian students.... A rising concern will come
from Asian students and Asians in general as the number and propor-
tion of Asian students entering at the freshman level decline-how-
ever small the decline may be."'52 In 1984, U.C. Berkeley, in a rather
46. Dana Y. Takagi, From Discrimination to Affirmative Action: Facts in the Asian
American Admissions Controversy, 37 Soc. PROBS. 578, 578 (1990).
47. WILSON, supra note 32, at 151.
48. Id. This finding by the OCR at Harvard may be contrasted with the admission by
Stanford University, which seems to implicitly acknowledge bias against Asian Americans,
that "'the overrepresentation of whites among special groups such as alumni legacies,
faculty/staff children, and athletes did not work to account for the differential rate of ad-
missions except in a relatively minor way."' Grace W. Tsuang, Note, Assuring Equal Ac-
cess of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities, 98 YALE L.J. 659, 670 n.77 (1989)
(citing STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON UNDER-
GRADUATE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AIDS 5 (1986)).
49. WILSON, supra note 32, at 151.
50. Id.
51. Cf. Tsuang, supra note 48, at 676 (discussing potential defenses of a public univer-
sity to charges of bias against Asian American applicants).
52. Id. at 676 n.117 (quoting Memo from Rae Lee Siporin, UCLA Director of Admis-
sions, to Undergraduate Enrollment Committee (Dec. 10, 1984)).
blatant fashion, reduced the number of Asian Americans admitted by
20.9% from the previous year. 3 Despite evidence such as this, white
students continue to be admitted to U.C. Berkeley over Asian Ameri-
cans with stronger academic credentials.5 4
I can imagine a television advertisement depicting an Asian
American student crumpling a rejection letter from U.C. Berkeley or
UCLA with this voice-over: "You were better qualified, but they had
to give your seat to a white student." The problem is that conserva-
tives have already created a different voice-over in which Asian
American students are being told that their seats are going to lesser
qualified Blacks and Hispanics. s
This is "divide and conquer" at its best, or worst, depending on
your perspective. Asian Americans are pitted against Blacks and His-
panics as if there are only a certain number of seats available for mi-
nority students. This is true only if a certain number of seats are
reserved for white students. Through negative action against Asian
Americans, whiteness becomes a diversity category meriting a "plus"
in many admissions processes,56 demonstrating how the merit and
fairness rationales are a smoke screen for what is really being pro-
tected-white entitlement.
I have focused so far on the admission of Asian Americans to
elite institutions of higher education, but the relationship of Asian
Americans and affirmative action is much more complicated. First,
care must be taken to acknowledge the tremendous diversity within
the Asian American community so that the relative success of Chinese
Americans, Japanese Americans, and Korean Americans will not ob-
53. Id. at 673.
54. Tsuang documents how U.C. Berkeley adopted a two-tiered system in which
"[s]tudents in the first tier are admitted solely on the basis of scholastic criteria... while
students in the second tier are evaluated both on scholastic and non-academic criteria." Id
at 662. Asian American applicants did well in Tier 1, but white students were admitted at
disproportionate rates over Asian Americans in Tier 2. Id. Tsuang demonstrates how non-
academic criteria operate against Asian Americans through outright or unconscious bias.
Id. at 663-65. The resort to more subjective criteria echoes the move made by Harvard in
1926 to weigh subjective characteristics such as "character, personality, and promise"
which were then used to exclude Jews and Catholics. See Lamb, supra note 32, at 494.
55. Takagi, supra note 46, at 588-89. See also Frank Wu, Neither Black nor White:
Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. TmRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
56. See, e.g., Dong, supra note 45, at 1029 (discussing the desegregation consent decree
at Lowell High School, a selective public school in San Francisco that effectively gives
whites a preference over Chinese American applicants); and Wu, supra note 55, at 271-81
(discussing affirmative action for whites).
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scure the very different situations of other Asian American groups .
7
Second, although certain Asian American groups have enjoyed a fair
amount of success in admission to elite educational institutions, all
Asian American groups face continuing discrimination in the work-
place.58 Affirmative action is still necessary for certain Asian Ameri-
can groups even in the context of elite school admissions, and it is still
necessary if Asian Americans are to overcome the employment dis-
crimination, often taking the form of glass ceilings, that operates to
prevent our advancement.5 9
Asian Americans are told by conservatives that affirmative action
hurts us. Yet even as efforts are being made to dismantle affirmative
action for racial minorities, no efforts are made to dismantle the pref-
erences given to whites that hurt Asian Americans. It is within this
context that Asian Americans must decide if we will let ourselves be
used as pawns in the struggle over affirmative action.
60
This brings me to my third story.
57. See generally Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their
Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24-31 (1994) (discussing the diversity within Asian
America and the danger of overgeneralizing the success of Asian Americans as a "model
minority").
Recognizing this diversity and the underrepresentation of Pacific Islanders, Filipinos,
and Southeast Asians, the Stanford Asian and Pacific Islander Law Students Association
protested a system of aggregating Asian Americans, which resulted in no Asian American
groups being considered for affirmative action purposes by the law school. See Paul Brest
& Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 855-56 (1995).
58. See Asian Pacific American Population Repor4 January 1996, ASIAN WEEK: THE
VoICE OF ASIAN AMERICA, January 19, 1996, at 14, 15. Although college-educated Asian
and Pacific Islander women had similar average earnings to non-Hispanic White women
($31,780 compared to $32,920), "[c]omparable Asian and Pacific Islander men ($41,220)
earned about $87 for every $100 of non-Hispanic White men's earnings ($47,180)." Id.
Asian and Pacific Islander men and women who were high school graduates earned less
than their non-Hispanic white counterparts. Id.
59. See, e.g., Henry Der, Asian Pacific Islanders and the "Glass Ceiling"-New Era of
Civil Rights Activism?: Affirmative Action Policy, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICA[,] A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT: POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR 2020, at 215 (LEAP
Asian Pac. Am. Pub. Policy Inst. & UCLA Asian Am. Studies Ctr. eds., 1993).
For a look at Asian Americans in the legal academy as professors, see Pat K. Chew,
Asian Americans in the Legal Academy: An Empirical and Narrative Profile 3 ASIAN LJ.
(forthcoming 1996); Eric K. Yamamoto, We Have Arrived, We Have Not Arrived: Asian
American Faculty Hiring and Retention in an Era of Backlash, 3 ASIAN L.J. (forthcoming
1996); Alfred Yen, A Statistical Analysis of Asian Americans and the Affirmative Action
Hiring of Law School Faculty, 3 ASIAN L.J. (forthcoming 1996).
60. Cf. Mari Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, Address Before the Asian Law Caucus
Annual Fundraising Dinner (Apr. 1990), in 1 UCLA ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 79
(1993).
Last fall, I attended a conference at American University entitled
"The American Dilemma and the Rehnquist Court." One of the
panels was on affirmative action. One panelist, Richard Kahlenberg,
who claimed to be sympathetic to the need for affirmative action, ar-
gued that because race is so volatile, the pragmatic approach to saving
affirmative action in some form is to abandon race and move to pref-
erences based on class or socioeconomic disadvantage.6'
An overlooked fact is that under such an affirmative action
scheme, whites (and perhaps Asian Americans) would be the primary
beneficiaries. I am being generous when I say "overlooked."
Kahlenberg, in an article in The New Republic, finesses this issue by
suggesting that "class preferences will disproportionately benefit peo-
ple of color in most contexts-since minorities are disproportionately
poor."62 However, in the context of admissions, the data suggest
otherwise. Even Kahlenberg notes: "[W]hen you control for income,
African American students do worse than white and Asian students
on the SAT-due in part to differences in culture and linguistic pat-
terns, and in part to the way income alone as a measurement hides
other class-based differences between ethnic groups."6 3 It is unclear,
then, how a class-based affirmative action program would take these
differences into account in such a way that whites (and perhaps Asian
Americans) would not be its greatest beneficiaries.
The result of such a class-based approach, with the preference for
legacies left intact, would be that the primary beneficiaries of prefer-
ences would be whites. In theory, this would be constitutionally per-
mitted because these preferences would be given to whites despite the
fact that they are white and not because of their whiteness. In prac-
tice, this would be a disaster for racial minorities.
In many ways, the panel discussion was typical of many debates
on affirmative action, including the fact that no one had mentioned
gender. Disturbed by this omission, I asked the panelists to address
the fact that affirmative action had been racialized when most studies
showed that the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action had been
61. Transcript of Proceedings, Conference on The American Dilemma and the Rehn-
quist Court (Sept. 21, 1995), in 45 AM. U. L. REv. 567 (1996) [hereinafter Transcript].
62. Kahlenberg, supra note 33, at 27.
63. Id.
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white women.64 Mark Hager, a professor at American University, an-
swered: "I'm opposed to affirmative action on the basis of gender.
65
I wanted to ask the moderator to declare the answer non-respon-
sive and to direct the panelists to answer the question, but time had
expired and no answer was forthcoming. Instead, I was left to puzzle
over why the debate has been racialized in such a way that gender has
disappeared from the picture. What are we to make of the fact that
the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action have been white wo-
men? Where were their voices?
It seems that a natural coalition might develop between white
women and women of color based on shared gender oppression, or
between white women and people of color based on more broadly-
based societal oppression. There have been attempts by opponents of
the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) to gain support from
white women.66 These efforts have largely failed. According to polls,
approximately 65% of white women are in favor of the so-called civil
rights initiative that would do away with affirmative action based on
race and gender.67 At first blush, one might wonder at this position
among white women that seems to go against their self-interest. But
this depends on how one characterizes the self. Is the self a racial
self? Or a gendered self? We might ask, as did Catharine MacKinnon
in a different context, "What is a white woman anyway?"
68
However, this issue has been masked by the invocation of family.
White women have brothers, sons, and, making a heterosexist assump-
tion, husbands. Insofar as affirmative action is blamed for white men
not getting jobs or admission to schools, and insofar as these white
men are seen as their husbands, brothers, and sons, this means affirm-
ative action is hurting the families of white women.69 Proponents of
64. Transcript, supra note 61, at 678. For the proposition that white women have been
the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action, see NATALIE J. SOKOLOFF, BLACK WOMEN
AND WHITE WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS: OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION BY RACE AND
GENDER, 1960-1980, at 18-19 (1992).
65. Transcript, supra note 61, at 679.
66. Charles Oliver, Next Hot Button in California, INVESTOR's BUSINESS DAILY, May
9, 1995, at Al.
67. Susan Sward, Generation Gap, Color Gap: Women Split on Affirmative Action, S.F.
CHRON., March 31, 1995, at Al.
68. Catharine MacKinnon, From Theory to Practice, Or What Is a White Woman Any-
way, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
69. Cf. Ramon G. McLeod, Family ies Help Explain Why Women Are Split: Many
Worried About Husband's Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1995, at A4 ("[U]nless affirmative
action advocates can convince these women that the policy that helped them individually
will not hurt their family's economic security, white women cannot be counted on at the
polls.").
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CCRI "are playing on people's worries about their jobs by arguing
that affirmative action is the reason 'a lot of white men are unem-
ployed.., not because of corporate downsizing, automation, com-
puterization, all the reasons that there has been a shift in the
economy."' 70  Affirmative action becomes a scapegoat here in pre-
cisely the same way that conservatives cast affirmative action as the
cause of lower admissions rates for Asian Americans. 7'
Family can be invoked in the affirmative action debate without
explicit reference to race-remember that 99% of whites were mar-
ried to other whites in 1987.72 Because of this statistic, an appeal to
family does the work of an explicit call to racial solidarity. Further,
there is a national dimension to this appeal to family such that it is not
only about the American Family but is about the Family that is
America. Just as most white Americans remain prejudiced against al-
lowing racial others into their families,73 this same prejudice also
manifests itself in the form of anti-immigrant sentiment directed at
preventing entry of racial others into the Family that is America.7 4
This reconfiguration of American national identity around family
echoes an earlier reconceptualization of collective national identity in
familial terms that Walter Benn Michaels identifies as beginning in the
70. Sward, supra note 67, at Al (quoting Patricia Ireland, president of the National
Organization for Women).
71. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
73. HOWARD SCHUMAN, ET AL., RACIAL ATrIuDEs IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND IN-
TERPRErATIONS 74-75 (1988). The authors note that in 1983, 40% of white Americans
approved of intermarriage between blacks and whites. Id. Extrapolating from this figure,
and the fact that the question had only two possible answers, yes or no, I assume then that
this means 60% of white Americans disapproved of black/white interracial marriage.
Compare this with the 78% of black Americans who approved of interracial marriage in
1983. Id. at 144-45. It is also interesting to note that in 1987, 27% of white Americans
favored laws against intermarriage of blacks and whites. Id. at xii. The authors do not
report on black attitudes toward anti-miscegenation laws.
74. A historical example of this type of sentiment towards Japanese immigrants is pro-
vided in Herbert P. Le Pore, Prelude to Prejudice: Hiram Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, and
the California Alien Land Law Controversy of 1913,61 S. CAL. Q. 99 (1979), reprinted in 2
Charles McClain, ASIAN AMERICANS AND TE LAW: JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 265 (1994). Le Pore notes that:
Progressives in California believed that economic self-preservation was closely
united with racial preservation. It was believed that, if the Japanese were allowed
to make economic inroads, it would only be a matter of time before they would
make racial inroads. Inter-marriage and propagation of their race would impair
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1920s.71 This conjoining of family and nation took place during a na-
tional identity crisis America was undergoing. In addition to various
sectional and class conflicts, the North was struggling with immigrants
from eastern and southern Europe, the South was struggling with
Blacks, and the West was struggling with immigrants from Asia.
Family was invoked to mediate these conflicts. It was no accident
that D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation, which presaged the trend
identified by Michaels, ends with a double marriage, the brother and
sister from the (white) Northern family marry the respective sister and
brother of the (white) Southern family.76 The brothers and sisters
achieve through their literal union the symbolic reunification of North
and South." The rebirth of America is achieved, and family becomes
the site of American identity.
Family in this context has a specific racial content-it is white.
The result is that "[i]nsofar as the family becomes the site of national
identity, [American] nationality becomes an effect of [white] racial
identity. 7 8 This reconceptualization allows a policing of the bounda-
ries of the national community along racial lines through an invoca-
tion of family.79 In the same way that the (white) family must be
protected from the predations of the transgressive sexuality of men of
color, the proper racial order of the Family that is America must be
preserved. It was no accident that anti-immigration sentiment
75. Michaels comments:
[I]t was in terms of familial relations (as opposed, say, to economic relations or
regional or even generational relations) that the new structures of identity were
articulated. America, A Family Matter was the title of Charles W. Gould's nativist
polemic of 1922. And, although Horace Kallen's Culture and Democracy in the
United States (1924) was directed against nativism, Kallen shared Gould's model
of national identity; according to him, the very idea of "nationality" was "familial
in essence."
WALTER BENN MICHAELS, OUR AMERICA: NATIVISM, MODERNISM, AND PLURALISM 6
(1995).
76. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (1915). In brief, the film tracks the breakup and reunifi-
cation of the country by following two white families, from the North and South, through
the Civil War, Reconstruction, and Redemption. On the impact of this film, see JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, The Birth of a Nation: Propaganda as History, in RACE AND HISTORY:
SELECTED ESSAYS, 1938-1988, at 10, 15 (1989).
77. FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 15.
78. MICHAELS, supra note 75, at 8.
79. I discuss this more fully by examining the national dimensions of the racial-sexual
policing that takes place in D.W. Griffith's THE BIRTH OF A NATION (1915) and a lesser
known film, Cecille B. DeMille's THE CHEAT (1915) in ROBERT S. CHANO, Dreaming in
Black and White, in DIS-ORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE
(forthcoming 1997).
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reached a fever pitch during this period.8 0 Nor is it an accident that
anti-immigration sentiment directed against Asian and Hispanic immi-
grants has reached a fever pitch today. And it is not a coincidence
that a nationalized form of family-for example, the Christian Coali-
tion's Contract with the American Family-has made a return to the
political scene.
One difference, though, is that today's return to the traditional
family located within the nation-space of America is not just a return
to an earlier racial order; it embodies a return to traditional gender
roles. Understood in this way, the appeal to family in the context of
the anti-affirmative action movement is an attack on feminism. But
unlike the backlash against feminism in the 1980s,81 this attack is
much more subtle.
In theory, because white women have been the primary benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action, they should be the primary targets of the
anti-affirmative action forces. However, the vote of white women is
considered crucial for CCRI.82 So how do you avoid gender conflict,
especially in light of continued discrimination against women?
I think the key here is patriarchy. Because patriarchy operates in
such a way that women earn only 71 cents for every dollar a man
makes, 3 the economic interests of white women may be better served
if their husbands, brothers, and sons do well.84 Instead of gender soli-
darity between white women and women of color, and gender conflict
between white women and white men, white racial solidarity is
achieved through an appeal to family. Never mind that white women
are to sacrifice their own opportunities and those of their sisters and
daughters.
I began by framing the attack on affirmative action within a
larger context of anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism senti-
ment. I see this sentiment as part of an attempt to return to an (imagi-
nary) America past, to restore America to its former glory. This
would entail a return to a former racial and gender order. However,
an explicit call for white racial solidarity to protect white male entitle-
80. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988).
81. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN (1991).
82. Sward, supra note 67, at Al ("[Flemale voters are bound to be a prime target for
both initiative backers and foes: As women go, so may go the war.").
83. Id.
84. See McLeod, supra note 69, at A4.
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ment is not a politically viable strategy. Instead, the innocent white
male as victim is created by cries of reverse racism or reverse discrimi-
nation. The innocent white male is then used in conjunction with an
explicit invocation of family. Together, these operate as an implicit
call to white racial solidarity and also mediate the potential gender
conflict between white women and white men.
I have developed this thesis through three encounters I have had
with affirmative action. One very salient fact revealed to me through
these encounters is that there are an awful lot of affirmative action
babies out there. And I would venture to say that most of these af-
firmative action babies are white.
I have argued that the move to abandon preferences for racial
minorities, while leaving intact preferences that primarily benefit
whites, is not about fairness or merit at all. It is about protecting
white entitlement. I have also argued that the move to abandon pref-
erences on the basis of gender, when discrimination against women
remains rampant, is also not about fairness or merit. It is about pro-
tecting patriarchy. Put the two together, and it is an attempt to return
to an America that once was. But turning back the clock is a poor
way to step into the future.
When my father wanted to pursue a master's degree in English in
the United States, Howard University gave him the opportunity. His
year there was a tumultuous one. In addition to the race riots/rebel-
lions that were sweeping the nation, there was much unrest on the
Howard campus. During one such volatile period, the ROTC building
on campus was burned down to protest the war in Vietnam. I am not
sure what he saw in all of this. Sometimes, I think that he was crazy to
send for my mother, my brother, and me from Korea. I am sure that
he was motivated to some extent by the American dream, but I think
there was more. He had a dream of America, not what it was, but
what it could be. And that is the America that he wanted for us. It is
the America that he taught us to work toward.
Instead of a return to an America past, I urge us to dream of an
America future, where conditions exist so that we really may pursue
the American dream. If we are to ever get there, we must, as David
Roediger reminds us, transform "reverse racism" from a curse into an
injunction: Reverse racism! It will be difficult, but let us work to-
gether to make real this dream that is America.
